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FEDERAL COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR THE
ABATEMENT OF WATER POLLUTION
I. Introduction
As a result of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, I federal common law, a new and potentially
effective remedy, has been made available to parties seeking relief
in water pollution cases in the federal courts. However, the possibility of non-sovereign parties using federal common law remedies
to protect the waterways may be severely diminished as several
federal courts have restricted such remedies to suits involving interstate waterways.' This Note will examine the effect of these
decisions on the ability of parties to initiate waterway pollution
suits based on the federal common law and consider whether such
decisions correctly interpret the intent of Illinois.
II.

Water Pollution and the Federal Common Law

The primary efforts at abating water pollution focus on statutory
remedies. 3 However, the present statutory approach can never be
fully effective. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act 4 emphasizes the development of a regulatory scheme' and does
not permit the granting of civil damages to private parties., Furthermore, the statute regulates effluent discharges7 but cannot be used
to control non-point sources' of water pollution. In addition, citizens
cannot use the statute to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
1.

406 U.S. 91 (1972).

2. See Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying
principles of Illinois to air pollution).
3. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(Supp. V, 1975); The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-41
(Supp. V, 1975).
4. 33 U.S.C. 9§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V, 1975).
5. Id. § 1252(a).
6. A private citizen having an interest which is, or may be, adversely affected can only
bring an action to enforce an effluent limitation or order issued by the Federal Environmental
Protection Administrator or a state with respect to such effluent limitation. Id. § 1365.
7. Id. § 1312.
8. Id. § 1362(11)-(12). A non-point source is one which is not a "discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. §
1362(14).
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navigable waters any sooner than the timetables set down in the
Act? The common law, however, is free from the restrictions inherent in a statutory approach and equitable remedies offer the courts
the flexibility to fashion effective relief to prevent the degradation
of the nation's waterways.
The common law action for public nuisance provides citizens with
an opportunity to seek relief since it addresses itself to acts or omissions which obstruct or cause inconvenience or damage to the public
in the exercise of rights common to all.'" In such cases, courts will
give great weight to public interests when balancing the equities and
deciding petitions for injunctive relief" and awarding damages. 2
The principles of common law are of particular utility in the
federal courts since these courts are more likely to view the problem
of water pollution in national rather than local terms. Consequently, the federal common law of public nuisance may represent
a most effective tool for arresting the deterioration of our waterways.
III. The Emergence of Federal Common Law
The trend towards the creation of federal common law 3 had seem9. See id. §§ 1251(a), 1311(b). See, e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) where the court noted:
Permitting an interim discharge of pollutants is in accordance with the comprehensive
regulatory scheme of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
Its ultimate objective is the elimination of all water pollution. Purity however, is not
to be achieved or required instantaneously. Instead the Act establishes a series of steps
which impose progressively stricter standards until the final elimination of all pollutant discharges is achieved, that being envisioned for the year 1985.
Id. at 1007-08.
10. J. STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105 (1890).
11. Public interests have been held to outweigh all other considerations. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937); Radich v. Kruly, 226 Cal. App. 2d
683, 38 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Ct. App. 1964). Ordinances and licenses do not protect a nuisance
from injunction by their mere existence. A license or statutory authorization carries with it
no immunity if a nuisance is created. See Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465,
468 (1st Cir. 1960). Some courts have held that the investment of a polluter in its activity
can never outweigh its neighbors' rights to clean air and water. See American Smelting &
Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 230-34 (8th Cir. 1907); United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 416
(C.C. Del. 1905).
12. Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933); Sussex Land &
Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F. 597, 605 (8th Cir. 1923).
13. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), held that the federal courts were free to
adopt and apply general principles of federal common law in all matters that were not
specifically regulated by local statutes.
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ingly been reversed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 4 when
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that there was no "federal general common law."' 5 The matter, however, was not fully resolved by Erie
because in another decision 6 handed down that same day, Mr. Justice Brandeis used "federal common law." Despite this uncertainty,
Mr. Justice Jackson perhaps best clarified the character of federal
common law in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC:7
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that
of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents of service of process and of the application of the venue statutes. It is
found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal common
law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional
common-law technique of decision and to draw upon sources of the common
law in cases such as the present.

Accordingly, there has been a willingness, even after Erie, to
fashion federal common law. 8 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills 9 the Supreme Court held that the federal common law could
be applied to suits involving violations of contracts between an employer and a labor union 0 and that courts could fashion such law
through judicial inventiveness from the policy of the national labor
law.2' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ivy BroadcastingCo.
v. AT&T Co." went further and applied federal common law on the
sole basis of extensive federal regulation. In Ivy the federal interest
in telephone companies was held to be so strong and the regulation
of such companies so comprehensive that a remedy for tort and

14.
15.
16.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Mr.

Justice Brandeis stated: "Whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes
nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Id. at 110.
17.

315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942). (Jackson, J., concurring).

18.

For a further discussion concerning the use of the federal common law, see Friendly,

In Praiseof Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 383 (1964).
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

20. The Court stated: "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned." Id. at 457.
21.

Id. at 456-57.

22. 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
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breach of contract was held to exist under federal common law even
though federal statutes provided no such remedies.23
More significantly, federal common law was recently made explicitly available for water pollution cases in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee." The state of Illinois sought leave to file a federal court
complaint for polluting Lake Michigan against four cities in Wisconsin, and the sewerage commissions of both the city and county
of Milwaukee. Illinois alleged that it prohibited and prevented such
discharges into the lake and that the resultant water pollution
caused by the defendants' failure to take comparable measures constituted a public nuisance.25 Although the Court did not decide the
merits of the case since it declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, it stated that the issues of the case could be litigated under
the principles of federal common law in the appropriate district
court.2

Illinois involved interstate water pollution, but the decision indicates that the scope of federal common law should not be restricted
solely to those facts. Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that "[wihen we deal with air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law
.

. ,"27 Furthermore, the Supreme Court repeatedly expressed its

intention to extend the application of federal common law to public
nuisances caused by the pollution of either "interstate or navigable
waters," 2 regardless of the jurisdictional amount2" or the character
of the parties. 0 In so concluding, the Court recognized that the
pollution of the waterways, whether interstate or just navigable,
presented a federal question."
23. Id. at 490.
24. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
25. Id. at 93.
26. Id. at 98-101. This holding was perhaps anticipated by Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971), which permitted the State of Texas to bring an action in federal district
court, under federal common law, to enjoin New Mexico residents from polluting the Canadian River. Id. at 242. The Court in Illinois also overruled its previous decision in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 n.3 (1971).
27. 406 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 99, 102, 104.
29. The court stated that the considerable interests in the purity of our waters put the
jurisdiction amount of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) beyond question. Id. at 98.
30. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
31. The Court stated: "The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters
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The Court was of course cognizant of the existing statutes32 designed to combat water pollution, but it was also aware of their
deficiencies:33
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time
pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes
to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits
alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution. . . .There are no
fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which the informed
judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.

Thus, although it conceded that the existing statutes might serve
as useful guidelines to the federal courts, the Illinois Court indicated
that these statutes will not necessarily set the boundaries of federal
common law 34 in areas such as water pollution control.
IV.

The Restrictive Reading of Illinois

Despite the broad language of Illinois, several recent lower court
decisions have taken a restrictive view of the scope of the federal
common law. In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,35 the federal government, several states and several environmental groups brought an
action against a Minnesota iron ore processing company to prevent
it from discharging its wastes into nearby Lake Superior (an interstate body of water) and into the air of neighboring Minnesota villages. 31 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected the
federal common law nuisance action to prevent the air pollution. It
viewed Illinois as applying only to instances where the pollution
source of one state harmed the environment of another" and found

creates actions arising under the 'laws' of the United States within the meaning of § 1331(a).
We hold that it does." 406 U.S. at 99.
32. The Court noted the existence of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id. at 10204.
33. Id. at 107-08. In United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp.
556 (N.D. II. 1973), the court held that the amendment of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act did not oust the federal courts from their federal common law jurisdiction. Id.
at 559.
34. 406 U.S. at 103 n.5.
35. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 499-500.
37. Id. at 520-21. The court found that the pollution of Lake Superior was controlled by
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that the trial evidence indicated only that the air in Minnesota
villages was affected by the waste emanating from the Minnesota
processing company. 8
The Fourth Circuit reached a comparable decision in Committee
for the Considerationof the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train.39
In Jones Falls, a group of Maryland citizens living near Jones Falls,
an intrastate navigable waterway, sought to enjoin the granting of
new sewage hookups to the existing Baltimore sewage system, which
was already dumping a substantial amount of untreated raw sewage
into Jones Falls.'" Since no statutory remedy was available under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972," a federal common law claim was asserted.
Although Jones Falls qualified as a part of the navigable waters
of the United States, 2 the court refused to apply federal common
law since no interstate controversy was presented. The majority
conceded that there was a body of federal common law where one
state infringed upon the environmental and ecological rights of another state 3 but it concluded that state law was sufficient for the
resolution of a local dispute."
The Jones Falls dissent viewed the discharge of pollutants into
navigable streams in a much broader light. 5 Although Baltimore's
dumping of raw sewage had an intrastate effect on those living near
Jones Falls, the dissent opined that such dumping adversely affected the national interest of making all "navigable" waters clean.,
The dissent also reasoned that the protection of such interstate
resources as the Chesapeake Bay could best be achieved by preventthe Water Pollution Control Act and granted the plaintiffs an abatement order under that
Act. Id. at 527-29.
38. Id. at 520-21.
39. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 1010-11.
41. Id. at 1007. A discharge permit had been applied for by the Baltimore officials and
the statute provided that during the pendency of such an application discharges would not
violate the statute. Furthermore, during the pendency of this litigation, the state agency, with
the authorization of the Environmental Protection Agency, actually issued a discharge permit. Id.
42. Id. at 1011.
43. Id. at 1008.
44. Id. at 1009.
45. Id. at 1012-16 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1012 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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ing the discharge of pollutants into its intrastate tributaries, including Jones Falls.47 Thus it interpreted the broad language of Illinois
as permitting the use of the federal common law in cases involving
either intrastate or interstate navigable waters. 8
Other federal courts have similarly attempted to ascertain the
scope of the federal common law principles announced in Illinois.
These courts have generally indicated an awareness of the scope of
the navigable waters problem but they have often refrained from
resolving it." For example, in Board of Supervisors v. United
States,5' the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia expressed its uncertainty as to the scope of the federal
common law in actions involving intrastate pollution. Accordingly,
it offered no solution to the problem, but merely expressed a willingness to afford to plaintiff "an opportunity . . . to amend its complaint relating to the interstate nature of the pollution .... ."
The Supreme Court's decision in Illinois explicity stated that
federal common law actions could be maintained to abate pollution
in navigable bodies of water. 2 Furthermore, in later decisions in
which it noted Illinois, the Court has exhibited no intention to narrow the scope expressed in its original decision. 3 Additionally, on
remand, the Illinois district court used the Supreme Court's
47. Id. The dissent relied on the dictum of EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which stated that Congress had shifted its emphasis
in the 1972 amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act from legislating water quality
standards of bodies of water to the elimination of the discharge of pollutants. 539 F.2d at 1012
n.7 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
48. 539 F.2d at 1013-14 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036,
1040 (7th Cir. 1975); Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 216 n.2 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1975). But see United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp.
672 (D. N.J= 1973), vacated on other grounds, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975). In Stoeco Homes, Inc. the federal government sought to enjoin a housing
developer from conducting dredging, fill and construction operations in South Harbor, a manmade lagoon measuring 125 feet wide, about one-half mile in length and approximately seven
to eleven feet deep. Id. at 674-76. The court applied federal common law solely because the
intrastate polluted waters in question were navigable. Id. at 679.
50. 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976).
51. Id. at 562.
52. See note 28 supra.
53. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 275 n.5 (1974); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 n.11 (1973); Washington v. General Motors, 406 U.S. 109, 112
n.2 (1972).
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"interstate or navigable waters" language. 4 Therefore, any attempt
to circumvent the Court's language appears to be contrary to the
Court's decision in Illinois.
The federal common law extends beyond the abatement of pollution in exclusively interstate bodies of water. The Illinois Court's
choice of the term "navigable waters" is significant since the term
has been broadly defined by statute as the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.55 The courts, consistent with
the intent of Congress,5" have given57 this definition the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation.
The Supreme Court in Illinois specifically stated that the pollution of interstate or navigable waters came under the federal question statute. Consequently, the federal nature of the dispute conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts. This is certainly appropriate since federal common law draws its substance from the Constitution and the federal laws." Moreover, there has been a trend in
environmental law legislation toward greater federalization"0 to the
extent that the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act now represents a
54. Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 299-300 (N.D. Ill. 1973), understood the Supreme Court as "holding that pollution of interstate or navigable water could be
abated under a federal common law claim based on nuisance and that such action was one
'arising under' the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and
within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts." Id. at 299.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. V, 1975).
56. S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3776. The conferees fully intended to give the term "navigable waters" the
broadest constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which had
been made or might be made for administrative purposes. Id. at 3822.
57. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), interpreted the statutory definition as
extending the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments to their constitutional limit to
include all tributaries of rivers which, when combined with other waters or systems of transportation, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, so that any activity on
such waters or pollution discharges into such streams would be regulated without regard to
whether the particular discharges on individual streams discernably affected interstate commerce. Id. at 964-65 n.1. See also National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392
F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), which held that Congress, by the statutory definition, asserted
federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the
commerce clause, and accordingly that the term was not limited to the traditional test of
navigability. Id. at 686.
58. 406 U.S. at 99.
59. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
60. Note, Clearing Muddy Waters: The Evolving Federalizationof Water\Pollution
Control, 60 GEO. L.J. 742 (1972).
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comprehensive federal scheme for controlling water pollution."'
Thus, the Supreme Court in Illinois intended to do more than
merely provide a forum for controversies between states.2
V.

Availability of Federal Common Law to Private Parties

Once it is established that environmental suits may be brought
under federal common law, there is some question as to who may
bring such suits. While courts have generally been more willing to
grant federal or state governments relief in water pollution cases,
there is nothing within the jurisdictional statute to restrict such
actions to disputes between sovereignties. 3 Furthermore, by deemphasizing the character of the parties that seek federal common
law remedies, the Supreme Court in Illinois opened the way to private suits when it stated: 4
Thus, it is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply
federal law. . . . [Wihere there is an overriding federal interest in the need
for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common law.

Additionally, the Water Pollution Control Act specifically authorizes citizens' suits and provides that such suits be brought in federal
district court, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the
amount in controversy." The Act also specifically preserves common law remedies. 6 Since federal common law draws its substance
from such statutes, citizens should be able to bring federal common
law actions on their own behalf, subject to the requirements of
standing and the substantive law of public nuisance actions.

61. See, e.g., the following provisions of the 1972 amendments: 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(Supp. V, 1975) (establishing national goals for the elimination of pollution); Id. § 1316(c)
(allowing state enforcement if its standards comply with federal regulation); Id. § 1319(a)(2)
(allowing the Administrator to enforce pollution limitations if a state fails to); Id. § 1370
(providing that no state standard may be less stringent than the federal regulations).
62. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
64. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
66. Id. § 1365(e).
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Jones Falls did not permit a private party to bring a common law
action of nuisance. 7 The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in Byram River v. Port Chester," however, took
a contrary view. Although that action was ultimately dismissed for
lack of personal jursidiction, the court recognized that it had federal
common law jurisdiction over the action even though it was brought
by private persons. 9
VI. Conclusion
The Court in Illinois expressed the view that there is a federal
interest in the abatement of pollution of interstate and navigable
waters. When an intrastate controversy arises, the issue is not
whether state law is sufficient for the resolution of such a dispute.7 0
Rather, the issue is whether such disputes are of federal concern. If
they are, the federal courts must be available to complainants.
The availability of federal common law remedies would not undercut a state's recognized, primary role in water pollution control. 7'
But, under Illinois, "it is federal, not state, law that in the end
controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters."7 The effect
of federal common law, therefore, is ultimately to fill any statutory
interstices73 and to provide a measure of uniformity74 to the rules
governing the waters, either interstate or navigable, of the United
States.
Increasing the availability of the federal courts, even to suits instituted by private parties, would not have the effect of opening the
floodgates to environmental litigation. In order to maintain such an
action, complainants would first have to satisfy standing require67. 539 F.2d at 1010.
68. 7 ENVIR. REP. 1127 (D. Conn. 1974).
69. Id. at 1128. The view permitting private parties to institute federal common law
actions is bolstered by the court's statement in United States ex rel. Scott v. United States
Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. Ill.
1973), to the effect that the granting of jurisdiction in such cases did not require a controversy between sovereignties.
70. 539 F.2d at 1009.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V, 1975) provides "It is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution ....
72. 406 U.S. at 102.
73. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
74. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6, 107 n.9.
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ments" and overcome the inherent restrictions of public nuisance
actions.7 6 Additional limitations on recovery of attorney's fees" and
the requirements for bringing class actions will similarly restrict the
number of cases brought under federal common law.
James D. Kakoullis
75. Under article III of the Constitution a litigant must show the existence of a real case
or controversy against his adversary. He must further demonstrate a sufficient personal stake
in the result of the dispute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Furthermore, an individual
asserting an environmental claim must show that he personally is threatened with immediate
or possible injury, and that he is not merely interested in the problem. Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
76. A private individual has no action for the invasion of a purely public right, unless his
damage is in some way distinguishable from that sustained by the general public. See Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (1917); Alexander v. Wilkes-Barre
Anthracite Coal Co., 254 Pa. 1, 98 A. 794 (1916). The private individual's damage must be
different in kind, rather than in degree, from that shared with the public. See Smedberg v.
Moxie Dam Co., 148 Me. 302, 92 A.2d 606 (1952). This distinction is of particular importance
in environmental suits since most courts limit the private individual's right to recover the
damages which he personally sustains on the rationale that pollution is a public problem
which the courts cannot effectively deal with in litigation between private parties. Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
77. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) held that environmental interest litigants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees for promoting public
interests absent statutory authorization. See 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 211 (1975).

